Cornell Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 3 Spring 1955

Article 4

Formation of Government Contracts Application
of Common Law Principles A Reply
Robert S. Pasley

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert S. Pasley, Formation of Government Contracts Application of Common Law Principles A Reply , 40 Cornell L. Rev. 518 (1955)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol40/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES
A REPLY
Robert S. Pasley*
The Editors of the Quarterly kindly gave me the opportunity to read
Mr. Stelzenmuller's article, "Formation of Government Contracts-Application of Common Law Principles,"'i before its publication in the last
issue. Both the author and the editors graciously accepted many of the
suggestions which I made for revision. I still have some reservations,
however, concerning Mr. Stelzenmuller's article, and the Quarterly has
generously afforded me the opportunity to make the following observations.
While Mr. Stelzenmuller seems to have numerous grievances against
Government procurement in general, he has selected two topics for special
criticism: one, the rule that in formal advertising bids may not be withdrawn after the opening and before the award; and two, the rule that the
Government is not bound by the unauthorized acts of its agents, even
when they are within the apparent scope of the agents' authority. While
I cannot go along with Mr. Stelzenmuller on the first point, I find myself
quite in agreement with him on the second, although I do have some
question about the specific illustration which he gives.
I
BIDS AFTER OPENING
Mr. Stelzenmuller's criticism of the rule that in formal advertising
bidders may not withdraw their bids after the opening seems to rest on
three main propositions: (a) it is based on historical error; (b) it is a
departure from general contract law; and (c) it has no statutory warrant.
Let us take up each of these in turn.
WITHDRAWAL OF

A. HistoricalError
We should be grateful to Mr. Stelzenmuller for demonstrating that the
rule does indeed seem to rest on historical error. He shows us that the
original opinions of the Attorney General were just the other way, and
that the case usually cited as the leading authority, Scott v. United States,.
is not authority for tbe proposition at all. For in that case, the bidder
was in fact allowed to withdraw, the only penalty imposed being the forfeiture of his bid deposit. It seems that by a gradual process of encroach* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 535, for biographical data.
1 40 Cornell L.Q. 238 '(1955).

2 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909).
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ment, extension, and misreading of prior opinions, the rule has assumed
its present form. But does this prove that it is "wrong"? Many a rule
of common law has developed in just this way. If we had to discard every
such rule, how much of our present law would remain? Before rejecting
a rule because it is historically unjustified, do we not also ask whether the
rule as we know it is unsound or unjust in practical effect? It seems to
me that Mr. Stelzenmuller confines his argument to a legal demonstration
that the rule is "wrong," because inconsistent with "general contract law,"
and virtually ignores the important considerations of public policy and of
procurement practice which have given rise to the rule and which justify
its existence. I think that these require some consideration before we
denounce the rule as a "serious error" and an example of "arbitrary official action." 3
Procurement by advertising, as conducted by the Government, is a formal process which must, in fairness to all, follow definite, established
procedures. Invitations are sent out and sealed bids4 solicited on clearly
defined specifications. A date and hour are set for opening the bids, and
all bidders are warned that late bids will not be considered, and that after
the opening bids may not be withdrawn or modified.5 On the day and at
the hour designated, the bids are opened in public, read aloud, and recorded in an "abstract." They are then evaluated by the Contracting
Officer, to determine (1) whether they are in fact responsive to the invitation, (2) whether the bidders are responsible, financially and otherwise,
and are eligible under the applicable statutes and regulations to receive
Government contracts,6 (3) whether there is any evidence of collusion or
3 Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 238.
4 That is, enclosed in a sealed envelope, not necessarily executed "under seal."
5 Instructions to this effect are included in U.S. Standard Form No. 22, "Instruction to
Bidders; Construction and Supplies," 44 C.F.R., § 54.12 (Supp. 1953), 41 U.S.C. App.
§ 54.12 (1952), which is incorporated by reference in U.S. Standard Form No. 30, "Invitation for Bids; Supply," 44 C.F.R. § 54.19 (Supp. 1953), 41 U.S.C. App. § 54.19 (1952),

as well as in other similar standard forms. In addition, the standard forms of bid include
an agreement by the bidder to execute a formal contract, or perform in accordance with the
bid, upon receipt of written notice of acceptance of the bid within 60 days (or less, if
specified) after the date of opening. See, e.g., U.S. Standard Form No. 31, 44 C.F.R.
§ 54.20 (Supp. 1953), 41 U.S.C. App. § 54.20 (1952). Typical regulations governing withdrawal or modification of bids are found in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
(hereafter referred to as "ASPR") ff 2-303, 32 C.F.R., § 401.303 (1951). IA C.C.H. Gov't
Contracts Rep. 1129,072 (1954).
6 For example, the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, applicable to supply contracts
above $10,000, requires that the contractor be a "manufacturer of or regular dealer in" the
supplies involved. 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 56 Stat. 277 (1942), 41 U.S.C. §§ 3545 (1952). The Government maintains a list of debarred bidders, who are ineligible to
receive awards, either because of violation of or non-compliance with some statute, fraud,
prior defaults, or other substantial reason. See, e.g., A.S.P.R. pars. 1-600 to 1-609, 32 C.F.R.
§§ 400.600-400.608 (Supp. 1953), 1A C.C.H. Gov't Contracts Rep. ff 29,049 (1954).
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other irregularity, 7 and (4) which bid, price and other factors considered,
is the most favorable to the Government. This process takes a little time.
Freight rates must be calculated, discounts computed, financial ratings
checked, pre-award surveys conducted, lists of debarred bidders consulted, and so on. Typically, the Government reserves from 15 to 60 days
to reach its decision, although normally it does so a good deal sooner.
Now if, while this is going on, a bidder can withdraw or modify his bid,
the whole procedure is thrown into uncertainty and confusion; in fact, it
becomes unworkable. Not only that, bidders would be able to gamble on
the result. If a bidder liked what appeared to be the probable outcome, he
would hold the Government; if he did not, because of changes in the
market or otherwise, he would withdraw his bid. The possibilities of
chicanery and sharp practice, if not outright fraud, are limitless.8
For, and this is the important point which Mr. Stelzenmuller does not
mention, the Contracting Officer has only two alternatives. He is bound
by law either (1) to accept the most favorable responsive bid by a responsible supplier, or (2) reject all the bids and start over.' The situation
is altogether unlike the case of the private businessman, who is free to
accept any offer he likes, high, low, or intermediate, for any reason he
likes, or to select one offer and use it as the basis for a counter-offer. 10 By
the same token, it is altogether unlike the procedure followed in the
"negotiation" of Government contracts, in which the Contracting Officer
has the same freedom of action as the private businessman. And so it is
not surprising that in "negotiation" the ordinary rules of law are applied
and suppliers are allowed to withdraw their offers, or "quotations" as they
are called, at any time prior to acceptance by the Government. This difference in treatment, far from reinforcing Mr. Stelzenmuller's argument,
as he seems to believe,-" really demonstrates the exact opposite, namely,
that different rules are applied to the two cases because the situations are
different.
7 Both the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Federal Property Act require that
any bids received after advertising which evidence any violation of the antitrust laws be
referred to the Attorney General for appropriate action. 62 Stat. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C.
§ 151(d) (1952) ; 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252(d) (1952). Ordinarily, all such bids
would be rejected.
8 See Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524, 527 (1909).
9 Ibid. This requirement is codified in both Section 3(b) of the Armed Services Procurement Act [62 Stat. 22 (1948), 41 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1952)] and Section 303(b) of the
Federal Property Act [63 Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 253(b) (1952)]. It is true that the
Government may, in a proper case, reject all bids and negotiate with one or more of
the bidders. But the moment it does so, the ordinary rules of offer and acceptance apply,
and no bidder can be held to his bid as a "firm offer."
1o Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. CL. 524, 527 (1909).
11 Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 247 and n.43.
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It should be observed that the rule against withdrawal or modification
of bids after the opening is not so rigidly applied as to admit of no exceptions. Under the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, bids which show
an obvious or clerical error may be corrected by the Contracting Officer, and
bids which are the result of "mutual mistake" may be permitted to be
corrected or withdrawn."2 In cases where the Armed Services Procurement Regulation is not applicable, the courts have gone further and have
permitted withdrawal upon the showing of any "honest" mistake, "mutual" or otherwise, and even where the bidder has been negligent in submitting his bid.'"
True, the Government could, as Mr. Stelzenmuller suggests,14 require
a bid bond or deposit, and be satisfied with the forfeiture thereof if the
bidder should withdraw. But this solution does not fully preserve the
integrity of the procurement system outlined above; it would still permit
a certain amount of speculation on the outcome. More important, it would
not give the Government what it really wants, which is a contract for
supplies or services, not the forfeiture of a bid deposit or the proceeds of
a penalty bond. Finally, it would increase the over-all cost of procurement
to the Government, and thus to the taxpayer, because the cost of any
such requirement is ultimately reflected in the prices the Government has
to pay for what it buys. And, skeptics to the contrary notwithstanding,
Government procuring officials do think of the taxpayer. For these reasons, bid bonds are not widely used today, except in the case of construction contracts.
To go back to the matter of historical error. It is perfectly true that
the Scott case is not really authority for the present rule, because there
the bidder was in fact allowed to withdraw his bid and was required only
to forfeit his deposit. But if a bid is a mere revocable offer, unsupported
by consideration, why is not a bid deposit, which is equally unsupported
by consideration, recallable by the bidder? But the general rule is undoubtedly that which was followed in the Scott case, that the deposit is
forfeited, even though the bid which it is given to secure is revocable. 15
Williston 6 and Corbin:" both state that this is the law. Yet it is hard to
12 A.S.P.R. II 2-405, 32 C.F.R. § 401.405 (1951), 1A C.C.H. Gov't Contracts Rep. 1
29,085 (1954).
13 United States v. Lipman and Spilberg, 122 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1954); Rhode
Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
14 Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 247.
1 Turner v. City of Fremont, 170 Fed. 259 (8th Cir. 1909); Daddario v. Town of Milford, 296 Mass. 92, 5 N.E.2d 23 (1936).
16 1 Williston, Contracts § 61 (Williston & Thompson ed. 1936).
17 1 Corbin, Contracts § 47 (1950).
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justify the result on the basis of abstract principles, if presence or absence
of consideration is the test. Williston says that the deposit is forfeited
because that was the understanding of the parties. But is it not equally
their understanding, in our situation, by the very terms of the documents
signed, that the bid is to be a firm offer, irrevocable for a stated period?
Why is the one agreement binding, and the other not? That the result
is indeed anomalous appears from Wiliston's suggestion that a deposit
in the form of cash or a certified check is indeed forfeited, but if the deposit is represented by an uncertified check, the forfeiture can be prevented by the simple expedient of stopping payment on the check!"8 The
real reason for the distinction would appear to be, not the presence or
absence of consideration, but the traditional approach of the common law,
which would give effect to a transaction evidenced by the physical delivery
of a material object, whether a pledge, cash, or a sealed instrument, but
not to an "informal" executory promise, whether oral or in writing, unless
"consideration" was present. But however natural this distinction may
have appeared to the lawyer of the seventeenth century, it makes little
sense to the modern businessman.
The point I would like to make is, not that the Scott case is "right" or
"wrong," but that it has been an easy and logical step from the rule announced there, that the bid deposit is forfeited, to the rule announced in
the Refining Associates case, 9 and foreshadowed by prior administrative
rulings, that the bid itself is irrevocable.
Mr. Stelzenmuller discusses the court decisions rendered during the
period between the Scott case and the Refining Associates case and shows
that in none of them was a bidder in fact precluded from withdrawing his
bid. It is true therefore that none is authority, strictly speaking, for the
rule claimed by the Government. But in at least two of these cases,2" the
courts placed their decisions squarely on the ground of mistake, and in
the more recent of the two the court, after citing the prior cases, stated
quite unequivocally, albeit by way of dictum:
The federal common law rule, therefore, would appear to be this: Because
of the possibility of fraud among bidders the ordinary common law rule that
an offer can be withdrawn at any time before it has been accepted does not
apply to bids to the United States Government, but instead the rule is that
after the bids have been opened, a bidder cannot withdraw his bid, unless he
can prove that the desire 2to withdraw is due solely to an honest mistake and
that no fraud is involved. 1
Is 1 Williston, Contracts § 61, n.17 (Williston & Thompson ed. 1936).
'9

Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 115, 109 F. Supp. 259 (1953).

20 Alta Electric and Mechanical Co. Inc. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 466 (1940); United

States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284 (E-D. Pa. 1954).
21 United States v. Lipman, 122 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
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I hardly think that these cases, even though they can be distinguished as
to result, can be wholly disregarded as authority.
The third case22 which Mr. Stelzenmuller discusses was also decided
on the ground of mistake, but the court went on to point out that the
invitation for bids had not contained any provision precluding withdrawal.3 Mr. Stelzenmuller says that the court did not explain how it
could have made any difference if the invitation had contained such a
provision, and the court's "remark would appear to be mere thoughtlessness. 2 4 This may be so, but it does seem to me that the case was decided
pretty squarely on the ground of mistake, and speculation as to what the
result might have been, if there had been no mistake and if the invitation had called for firm bids, is not going to help us very much today.
There is another, very recent case, which does seem to lend some support to Mr. Stelzenmuller's position, but which apparently appeared too
25
late for inclusion in his article. In United States v. Sunshine Dairy,Inc.,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a bidder who had,
after opening but before award, withdrawn his bid on an invitation to
supply milk to a Veterans' Administration Hospital. The Oregon State
Department of Agriculture had established new minimum prices for the
sale of milk, which were higher than the prices bid by the plaintiff. Notice
thereof, coupled with a threat to enjoin any deliveries at the bid price,
reached the plaintiff after it had submitted its bid, which it promptly withdrew because of this circumstance. The court held that the plaintiff was
justified in so doing, in that (i) it was threatened with injunctive proceedings and possible penalties, (ii) it had not been guilty of negligence,
(iii) the Government's Standard Form seemed to contemplate circumstances short of negligence where withdrawal might be justified, and
(iv) otherwise a gross injustice would be perpetrated. The court discussed the general rule that an offer may be revoked at any time before acceptance, and the Government's contention that that rule did not apply to
public contracts, and also discussed the Refining Associates case. The
court found the latter "important and interesting," but felt that the
reasoning therein was perfectly consistent with its own decision in the
case before it. While there is perhaps a suggestion in the opinion that the
court did not particularly care for the rule contended for by the Government, the court was careful not to invalidate that rule unnecessarily, and
its square decision of the case as coming within a permissible exception
can hardly be dismissed as thoughtless or inadvertent.
22

Nason Coal Co. v. United States, 64 Ct. C1. 526 (1928).

Id. at 533.
Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 244.
25 215 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1954).
23
24
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B. Departurefrom GeneralContractLaw
It is indeed written in the hornbook of the law that an offer may be
withdrawn at any time before acceptance, and that at common law there
is no such thing as a firm offer not supported by consideration. This
rule is simply one aspect of a more general principle of mutuality of
obligation believed to be fundamental in the law of bilateral contracts. 6
But how fundamental is the rule about the revocability of offers? Has
it always existed? Does it admit of no exceptions? Will it endure "to the
last syllable of recorded time"?
Although some writers tell us that the rule concerning the non-enforcibility of gratuitous promises has its origin in the remote mists of Germanic antiquity, the rules of offer, acceptance, and consideration as we
know them in the law of contract are of comparatively recent origin, at
least when viewed against the perspective of world history. They seem
to have developed as part of the struggle, fought out first in equity, to
give a remedy for the breach of an "informal" contract, at a time when
the common law recognized only the specialty or sealed instrument, enforcible by the action of covenant, the obligation to pay a sum certain,
supported by a quid pro quo, enforcible by the action of debt, and the
obligation to return a balled chattel, enforcible by the action of detinue 7
In this sense these newer concepts marked a great step forward in the
26 Corbin quotes the following version of the principle of mutuality of obligation, as
popularly understood: "It has been said, thousands of times, that both parties to a contract
must be bound or neither is bound." 1 Corbin, Contracts § 146 (1950). He then proceeds
to show that there are numerous situations where the supposed principle does not hold.
It would appear that more than one rule has grown up in the field of Government contracts which is at variance with the supposed rule of mutuality of obligation. For comments
on some of these, see Note, "Government Contracts: Pitfall for the Unwary?" 3 J. Pub.L.
276 (1954), criticizing 33 C.G. 180 (1953), and Note 27 So. Calif. L. Rev. 496 (1954), criticizing United States v. Weisbrod, 202 F.2d 629 (7th Cir. 1953).
27 See study prepared by Professor Horace E. Whiteside for the New York State Law
Revision Commission, "The Development of the Doctrine of Consideration," and authorities
cited therein. Second Annual Report of New York State Law Revision Commission 167-182
(1936). Professor Whiteside reached the following interesting conclusion on the question
here involved:
It was not a necessary consequence of the requirement of consideration in simple contracts that a 'simple offer should be revocable unless supported by a consideration.
Enforcement of offers according to their terms without reference to consideration would
not be equivalent to enforcement of a gratuitous promise; the offeror would in any
event be assured the consideration specified in his offer, and that consideration would
have to be sufficient in law. . . . It may be a consequence of the eighteenth century
will theory of contract that an offer should not bind the offeror after he has changed
his mind unless supported by a valuable consideration. Be that as it may, it is now
generally held that an offer or option (except the option under seal) may be revoked
at any time by mere communication of such revocation, notwithstanding that it is
irrevocable in terms or the offeror has promised to keep the offer open for a time. (Id.
at 137.)
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progress of the law. But it by no means follows that they are fixed, eternal principles, which lie forever beyond the possibility of change.
Now that the efficacy of the seal as a substitute for consideration has
been largely done away with,2" the common law rule that there can be no
such thing as an irrevocable offer unsupported by consideration has itself become an anachronism. The rule has been severely criticized,
especially in recent years.29
But even the common law has created occasional exceptions to the
rule. Take the case of the "auction without reserve," where the auctioneer is held to his promise not to withdraw the goods from sale, once
a bid has been made3 0 Although this rule is now codified in the Sales
28 There is no federal statute that I know of which abolishes the common law effect of
the seal. This raises the interesting possibility that bids on government contracts could be
rendered irrevocable by the simple expedient of requiring that they be submitted under seal.
The Navy formerly had such a requirement in the case of bids submitted on behalf of
corporations (see Navy Contract Law, 30, 290 (Navpers 10841, 1949)), but the present
regulations of the Armed Services and of General Services Administration do not include any
such requirement. Undoubtedly, however, the practice of placing a corporate seal on bids
is still widely followed. There is a question, however, whether a mere corporate seal,
without a recital, is enough to make a corporate instrument a specialty. See e.g., Hugg v.
Maxwell, 218 Fed. 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1914); Second Annual Report of New York State Law
Revision Comm., 291-296 (1936).
29 See, e.g., Pollock, Principles of Contract 21 (13th ed. by Sir Percy H. Winfield, 1950).
Pollock had stated the traditional rule. Professor Winfield added, in brackets:
Such was the decision in Dickinson v. Dodds E(1876) 2 Ch. Div. 463; 45 L.J. Ch. 777].
One reason for it was that there was no. consideration for keeping the offer open for the
specified time. It is submitted that this is unsound. A stated in his offer the exact price
of the house. That was the consideration on his side. Why should the law insist that he
was entitled to extra consideration for allowing the offeree a certain time within which
he could accept? Presumably he might have taken that very factor into account in
fixing the sum that constituted the price, i.e., he may have fixed it rather higher than
he would have done if no time had been specified.
Pollock's text goes on to show that the rule is different in modern Roman law: "There
a promise to keep a proposal open for a definite time is treated as binding, as indeed
there appears no reason why it should not be in a system to which the doctrine of consideration is foreign . . . ...
Pollock, op. cit. supra, at 21.
Our own critics are beginning to question more and more the soundness of the common
law rule on this point. See, e.g., Llewellyn, "What Price Contract?" 40 Yale L.J. 704, 742
(1931); Corbin, "Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts," 50 Harv. L. Rev. 449,
451-453 (1937); Sharp, "Pacta Sunt Servanda," 41 Col. L. Rev. 783, 792-793 (1941);
Fuller, "Consideration and Form," 41 Col. L. Rev. 799, 818-819 (1941); Mason, "Consideration-A Comparative View," 41 Col. L. Rev. 825, 844-848 (1941); Hays, "Consideration: A Legislative Program," 41 Col. L. Rev. 849, 859-860 (1941); Llewellyn, "Common
Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures?" 41 Col. L. Rev. 863, 872-873 (1941);
Corbin, "The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales: Should It Be Enacted?" 59 Yale L.J. 821,
827-829 (1950). For a dissenting view, see Havighurst, "Consideration, Ethics and Administration," 42 Col. L. Rev. 1, 23-25 (1942).
30 Warlow v. Harrison, 1 E. & E. 309, 120 Eng. Rep. 925 (1859); Johnston v. Boyes,
[1899] 2 Ch. 73, 68 L.J. Ch. Div. 425 (dictum). Contra: Anderson v. Wisconsin Cent. Ry.
Co., 107 Minn. 296, 120 N.W. 39 (1909). For an interesting controversy on the soundness
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Act,3 the fact remains that it was granted recognition, at least in England,
without the aid of legislation. Although this result is usually explained
in terms of orthodox theory,32 the fact remains that the common law
did really depart from the so-called "general" rule, precisely because the
business practice was different, and common usage in auction sales demanded recognition.
Another area where the common law of some jurisdictions has granted
halting recognition to the needs of business by creating an exception to
the "general" rule is in the case of the so-called "firm offer puzzle,"
where a general contractor has submitted a bid on a project in reliance
on "firm" offers from his suppliers, and then the latter have attempted
to revoke their offers before the general contractor has received an
award and accepted his suppliers' offers.33 Again, a few courts at least
of the English view, which raises many of the problems discussed herein, see Slade, "Auction
Sales of Goods Without Reserve," 68 L.Q. Rev. 238 (1952); Gower, "Auction Sales of
Goods Without Reserve," 68 L.Q. Rev. 457 (1952); and Slade, "Auction Sales of Goods
Without Reserve," 69 L.Q. Rev. 21 (1953). The view that the auctioneer may not withdraw
the goods in an auction without reserve, once a bid has been made, is supported in Restatement, Contracts, § 27 (1932); 1 Corbin, Contracts 341 (1950); and 1 Williston, Contracts
§§ 29, 30 (Williston & Thompson ed. 1936) [So stated at p. 69 of the text. The 1954 Supplement, which was not prepared by Professor Williston or Professor Thompson, states that this
rule, even though reflected in the Restatement, is entirely statutory in the United States, and
that there is no common law authority therefor in this country. This seems to be correct.
See Hashour, "Bids as Acceptances in Auctions 'Without Reserve."' 15 Minn. L. Rev. 375
(1941)).
31 Uniform Sales Act § 21(2). The rule is broadened in the Uniform Commercial Code
to prohibit the withdrawal of bids as well as of the goods in auctions without reserve.
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-328(3), and Comment 2.
32 For example, that in this type of auction, the auctioneer makes the offer, whereas in
the ordinary case he merely invites offers. 1 Williston, Contracts 69 (Williston & Thompson
ed. 1936). The English courts have rationalized the result by holding that attendance at and
participation in an auction without reserve creates a "collateral contract" between the auctioneer and the bidders. 1 Williston, Contracts 73 (Williston & Thompson ed. 1936) and
cases cited, n.2.
33 Northwestern Engineering Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943),
holding the suppliers' offers irrevocable on the theory of "promissory estoppel." Contra:
James Baird v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933). In Robert Gordon, Inc. v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1951), the court refused to accept the reasoning
of the Baird case, but on the facts held that promissory estoppel could not be invoked.
For two different views on this problem, see Schultz, "The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study
of Business Practice in the Construction Industry," 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237 (1952), and
Sharp, "Promises, Mistakes, and Reciprocity," 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 286 (1952). Although
Professor Schultz concludes that there seems to be little necessity to hold the supplier's offer
irrevocable in this situation (Professor Sharp disagrees), it is noteworthy that he has
attempted to make a thorough survey of actual business practices and needs in the area.
In a very recent article, Mr. Stoljar dismisses the problem as unreal, since the general
contractor has the power to accept the subcontractor's offer by making a counter-promise
to place his orders with the offeror should his own bid prove successful, and that such a
conditional promise constitutes valid consideration for a bilateral contract. Stoljar, "The
False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts," 64 Yale L.J. 516, 532-533
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have been willing to recognize that an exception should be made and
have held the suppliers' offers to be irrevocable, whether on a theory of
"promissory estoppel" or of "business custom."3 4 The real reason would
appear to be that the old rules do not always fit modern needs, and when
such a situation becomes acute, the common law, however reluctantly and
with however much creaking of the joints, does eventually change. And
it is to this very ability to change, to adapt itself to new and different
situations, when the facts and business practices warrant, that the common law owes its strength and its amazing capacity to survive the most
drastic political and economic upheavals. Deny this power of adaptation
and change to the common law, and it will soon cease to be a living
force in the modern world.
Dissatisfaction with the common law rule has been reflected in numerous proposals for legislative reform, some of which have been given effect.
The Uniform Written Obligations Act,3 5 adopted in Pennsylvania in
1927,38 pointed the way by making enforcible, without consideration,
any written promise containing the express statement that the signer
intended to be legally bound. Then in 1941, pursuant to a recommendation of the New York State Law Revision Commission,37 the New York
Legislature changed the common law by providing that a written signed
offer, stated to be irrevocable, shall be binding on the offeror for the
period stated, or if no time is fixed, for a reasonable time.38 In the words
of Professor George J. Thompson, thus fell "one of the strongest bastions
39
of the common law of consideration.1

40
A similar provision is included in the Uniform Commercial Code,

(1955).

If this is so, why is not the Government's conditional counter-promise, inherent in

its statutory obligation mentioned supra p. 520, to accept the most favorable responsive bid
from a responsible supplier, if it accepts any, valid consideration for the bidder's promise
to hold his offer open? The fact that such conditional counter-offers sound strange to our
legal ear proves only that the latter is more attuned to the artificialities of orthodox doctrine
than to the realities of business practice.
34 But cf. Albert v. R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949). The subcontractor's offer had been held irrevocable by the District Court on the ground that such
was the custom of the building trade in Louisiana [79 F. Supp. 27 (ElD. La. 1948)]. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that custom cannot create a contract. On the general
subject of business usage, see Wright, "Opposition of the Law to Business Usages," 26 Col.
L. Rev. 917 (1926).
35 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 418-419 (1951).
36 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 6-8 (1949).
37 Leg. Doc. 65(M) 11, 16, 52, Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Com., 355, 360, 396 (1941).
38 N.Y. Pers. Prop. L. § 33(5) ; N.Y. Real Prop. L. § 279(4).
39 Thompson, "New York Reconsiders Consideration," 15 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Bulletin
63, 77 (1943).
40 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-205. Although Professor Williston has criticized the
Code, his only objection to this section (aside from matters of wording) is that it is not
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also now law in Pennsylvania, 4 and almost certainly destined to be
adopted, in some form at least, in the remaining states. The English Law
Revision Committee recommended similar legislation for Great Britain in
1941,4" but this recommendation has apparently not been adopted."
Admittedly, these are statutes or proposed statutes, which have no
direct application to our problem. But they evidence considerable dissatisfaction with the common law rule. Perhaps the federal courts and
the Court of Claims, in recognizing an exception to the rule in the case
of Government procurement by formal advertising, without waiting for
a statute, are simply demonstrating that they are in touch with the times
and that much ahead of their more conservative fellow-lawyers, who "remove not the ancient landmarks." And is not this willingness to accept
change, when change is justified, itself in the grand tradition of the
common law?44
as general in its application as the Uniform Written Obligations Act. Williston, "The Law
of Sales in the Proposed Commercial Code," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 576-577 (1950).
41 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-205 (1954).
42 Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine
of Consideration), CMD No. 5449, at 22-23 (1937). But see criticism of this report by
Hamson, "The Reform of Consideration," 54 L.Q. Rev. 233 (1938).
43 The recent report of the English Law Reform Committee, First Report (Statute of
Frauds and Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893) CMD No. 8809 (1953), recommending repeal of the Statute of Frauds except for contracts of guaranty and land contracts
(which recommendation has been adopted by enactment of the Law Reform (Enforcement
of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3. Eliz. 2, c. 34), does not cover the problem of consideration
or of the irrevocable offer.
44 It is interesting to note that Lord Mansfield, some 200 years ahead of his time, tried
to eliminate the requirement of consideration in commercial cases involving written agreements, and won the entire Court of King's Bench to his view. Pillans and Rose v. Van
Mierop and Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765). The concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Wilmot is so pungently phrased that I cannot refrain from a few quotations:
I have traced this matter of the nudum pactum; and it is very curious.
Many of the old cases are strange and absurd; so also are some of the modern
ones; . . .
In another instance, the strictness has been relaxed; as for instance, burying a son;
or curing a son; the considerations were both past, and yet holden good. It has been
melting down into common sense, of late times.
But this victory over the doctrine of consideration was short-lived, and was repudiated by
the House of Lords in Rann v. Hughes, 7 T.R. 350 n, 101 Eng. Rep. 1014 n (1778), holding
that the common law recognized only two types of contracts, agreements by specialty, and
agreements by parol, and that the alleged third class, contracts in writing and therefore not
requiring consideration, did not exist.
In their recent casebook on contracts, Professors Kessler and Sharp make this observation:
Despite this set-back, Judge Wilmot's treatment of the consideration doctrine should
not be overlooked. His opinion contains the seeds of a possible expansion of consideration which would include not only actual reliance (forbearance) on the part of the
promisee but also the likelihood or risk of reliance. Outside commercial cases, however,
The
the potentialities inherent in this approach have been developed hardly at all ....
reluctance of the courts to apply a risk of reliance doctrine is strikingly illustrated by
of
a
their treatment of firm offers. Under a risk of reliance doctrine, the enforcement
firm offer would present no doctrinal difficulty. Kessler and Sharp, Contracts, Cases
and Materials 339-340 (1953).
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C. Lack of StatutoryJustification
Concededly, there is no federal statute which expressly changes the
common law rule. The problem would be a great deal simpler if there
were. But it seems significant to me that on two recent occasions Congress
has enacted comprehensive legislation in the field of Government procurement, the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947"5 and the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,48 without mentioning
the point.
This silence of Congress admits of a variety of interpretations. It may
mean that Congress intended to approve and keep in effect the common
law rule. But this is a palpable fiction. It may mean that Congress,
knowing of the administrative interpretations which had been placed on
Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes,4 7 which was in large measure restated by those parts of the new statutes dealing with formal advertising,4 8
intended to reaffirm such interpretations. This is equally a fiction, although it is one which has support in other fields where the intent of
Congress becomes important. 9
The truth is that Congress had no intention in the matter. It never
thought about the question, because it was never called to its attention.
I am satisfied that the reason it was not was that the executive agencies
which sponsored the new legislation must have assumed that the point
was too well settled to be debatable.
Mr. Stelzenmuller cites some of the statutes which do -exist, and argues
that none of them confers any rule-making power which would justify the
executive in issuing regulations, binding on those outside the Government,
45 62 Stat. 21 (1948), 65 Stat. 700 (1951), 41 U.S.C. § 151-161 (1952).
46 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 64 Stat. 591 (1950), 65 Stat. 700 (1951), 66 Stat. 594 (1952), 41

§ 251-260 (1952).
47 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1952).
48 62 Stat. 22 (1948), 41 U.S.C. § 152 (1952) ; 63 Stat. 395 (1949), 66 Stat. 594 (1952),
U.S.C. § 253 (1952). The wording of these two sections is identical, except for the substitution in the latter of the word "property" for "supplies." The legislative history of the
former makes it clear that Congress intended to restate the advertising requirements of
Revised Statutes § 3709 (supra note 47), in the light of a "century's accumulation of
statutes," while giving procurement officials broader authority to negotiate and, in the case
of advertising, to consider factors other than price in determining which bid is "most
advantageous to the Government." H.R. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1947); S. Rep.
No. 571, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1947), 2 U.S. Code Cong. Serv., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1048-9,
1064 (1948).
49 Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938); Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
306 U.S. 110 (1939); Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1944) cert. denied, 325 U.S.
850 (1945). But see Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939); Helvering v.
Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 395 and nA6 (1942); Commissioner of Int. Rev. v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 473, 477 (1955).
U.S.C.
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which change the general law of contracts.5 0 I will not dispute the point,
although my own concept of the rule-making power of the executive is
perhaps somewhat broader.
Mr. Stelzenmuller does not specifically cite Section 206 (a) (4) of the
Federal Property Act, 5 ' which authorizes the Administrator of General
Services to "prescribe standardized forms and procedures" for Government procurement, warehousing, and related activities, and which is the
statute under which the Government's standard forms, including instructions to bidders, are now issued. Nor does he cite Executive Order No.
6166, of June 10, 1933,52 issued under the Reorganization Act of 1933," 3
establishing a Procurement Division in the Treasury Department and
authorizing it to determine "policies and methods of procurement" and to
prescribe the "manner of procurement," which Executive Order is the
authority under which the earlier standard forms were issued, and which
for that matter is still in effect in this respect.54
Admittedly, however, the statute and Executive Order just mentioned
do not delegate any legislative power, which is Mr. Stelzenmuller's test, and
if the forms prescribed thereunder do in fact change the law to the detriment, and without the consent, of private parties, no authority therefor
can be found in this statute or this Executive Order. I would prefer to
rest the argument on the proposition that the regulations which have
been issued, and the forms which have been prescribed, simply reflect the
"federal common law" on the point, as it has developed over the past
forty-five years and as it has come to be recognized by the courts, the
Comptroller General, and the Attorney General, and as reinforced by the
statutory requirements, mentioned above, 55 binding the Government to
accept the most favorable responsive bid by a responsible supplier, or
else reject all bids.
50 Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 246-247.
51 63 Stat. 390 (1949), 40 U.S.C. § 487(a) (4) (1952).
52 5 U.S.C. § 132 note (1952).

53 47 Stat. 1517 (1933), 48 Stat. 16 (1933).
54 The authority to prescribe standard forms seems to have been inferred from the intent
of Executive Order No. 6166 as a whole, rather than from anything specifically set forth
therein. See for example 44 C.F.R. §§ 54.1-54.31 (Supp. 1953), prescribing standard forms
for use "without deviation by all Executive agencies for or in connection with every formal
contract of the kinds specified that may be entered into by them," which expressly cites as
authority Executive Order No. 6166. However, Section 602(b) of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (originally Section 502(b)), 63 Stat. 401
(1949), 64 Stat. 583 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 124-132 note (1952), expressly preserves certain
provisions of Executive Order No. 6166 relating to functions, then exercised by the Bureau
of Federal Supply (the statutory successor to the Procurement Division of the Treasury),
"with respect to standard contract forms."
55 Supra p. 520 and note 33.
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To sum up, I do not believe that the holding in the Refining Associates
case "teeters precariously on juristic straws,"' 5 6 or that it "necessarily
merits rejection by fair-minded men.1 57 I believe that it is supported by
compelling reasons of policy, which I have tried to outline above.
And I do not believe that these reasons are outweighed by the "desirability
of protecting the businessman's expectation that he will be contractually
bound with the government only by the same kind of juristic acts that
bind him to any business agreement," or by the "desirability of rational
consistency in the law.""" I submit that the average businessman knows
and cares little about "juristic acts," but does know a good deal about the
documents he signs, and when such a document includes his promise that
he will keep an offer open for a stated period, he expects to be bound
thereby, absent mistake, frustration, or impossibility of performance. As
for rational consistency, it is certainly a desirable goal. But it should not
be placed above the dictates of common sense, the actual practices of
Government buyers and suppliers, and the real needs of the Government.
II
APPARENT AUTHORITY

It seems to me that Mr. Stelzenmuller is on much firmer ground when
he criticizes the rule that the Government is not bound by unauthorized
acts of its agents, even though within the apparent scope of their authority. I agree with him that the application of this rule in its extreme form,
once perhaps necessary for the protection of the public purse at a time
when Government contracts were relatively few and it was fairly simple
to ascertain or verify the agent's authority, is not in keeping with today's
realities. And, as Mr. Stelzenmuller points out, the courts have in fact
resisted the strict application of the rule, and have found various ways of
escaping it, so much so that it can no longer be confidently asserted that
it really is the law.59 Yet the rule remains on the books, and is still in60
voked, especially by the Comptroller General, often with harsh results.
56 Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 247.
57

Ibid.

58 Ibid.
59 In addition to the cases cited by Mr. Stelzenmuller, see United States v. Jones, 176
F.2d 278, 282-285 (9th Cir. 1949); Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 192 F.2d 438 (3d
Cir. 1951).
The contracting officer had
60 A recent example is 34 Comp. Gen. 280 (1954).
purchased an electric water cooler on the open market for $190. In fact, unknown
to the contracting officer, the same item was available in a General Services Administration warehouse for $112. Under applicable regulations, all executive agencies were
required to procure their electric water coolers through General Services Administration.
The Comptroller General held that the contracting officer had exceeded his authority in
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But it is by no means clear that the contractor in Mr. Stelzenmuller's
illustration would have lost his case, had he stood by his guns. For the
law seems fairly clear that the Government is bound by a contract duly
entered into by an authorized contracting officer on the basis of a determination that the product offered is acceptable, even though that determination later turns out to have been erroneous. 1 It is simply not
true that the Government is "allowed to avoid every imprudent transaction" on the ground that "its agents have no actual authority to make
2
mistakes in judgment.

6

But before venturing an opinion whether the case cited by Mr. Stelzenmuller should have been decided in favor of the contractor, we should
note that we have before us only the contractor's ex parte version of the
facts. Without in any way questioning the latter's perfect good faith
in recounting his story to Mr. Stelzenmuller, I feel that I must point out
that, as every lawyer knows from experience, a grievance asserted by a
complainant will often assume an entirely different aspect after the other
side's version has been heard, and still another aspect after both versions
have been aired in court. Accordingly, I would prefer to suspend judgment on Mr. Stelzenmuller's illustration, as it is presented to us, until I
had heard the Government's side of the case.
But apart from this specific example, and generalizing a bit, it may well
be that the rule as commonly stated lends itself to abuse, and it is perfectly possible that it has been invoked in terrorem in cases to which it
was never intended that it apply. But my own experience in Government
procurement leads me to question Mr. Stelzenmuller's rather sweeping,
but undocumented, conclusions :63
1. That "there is no reason to believe that this is an isolated instance,
for the situation is fairly common";
2. That this "erroneous view of this area of the law is practically
universal among contracting officials"; and
3. That "not only is it taught them in training courses, but the very
example with which this discussion was begun is taught as an admirable
or ideal example of its application."
buying the water cooler elsewhere at a higher price. The contractor was, however, allowed
to recover $112, plus transportation.
Insult is added to injury by the doctrine that the rule is solely for the benefit of the
Government and may therefore not be invoked by the contractor. Accordingly, a liquidated
damages clause has been successfully invoked against a contractor, despite the fact that its
inclusion in the contract was contrary to regulations and apparently unauthorized. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 565 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
61 United States v. Jones, supra note 59.
62 Stelzenmuller, supra note 1, at 249.
63 Id. at 255.
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Finally, I cannot help but observe that on this subject Mr. Stelzenmuller is very critical of the present rule, which he describes as a "venerable commonplace," 6 4 a "musty rule-of-thumb doctrine as it is usually
67
stated,"'65' an example of "formulary reasoning,"6 6 and an "old rubric.)
Yet in the first part of his article, he accepts with equanimity the equally
venerable and unrealistic rule of the common law that there can be no
such thing as a firm offer without consideration. To me, this approach
lacks consistency, except on the premise that the Government must be
wrong either way. And that seems hardly fair.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I would like to say a few words in defense of that much
maligned individual, the Government contracting officer, and his even
more unpopular superior, the procurement policy official. Mr. Stelzenmuller, apparently drawing on his own experience as a contracting officer
and on the misfortunes of certain contractors as recounted to him, is very
unhappy about the whole situation. Although he concludes his article
with a plea to the "fair minded" procurement official, his other statements
leave the definite impression that that official is a rare personage indeed.
For, we are told, contracting officials as a class seem to display a "rather
cavalier attitude" toward the "application of dubious legal principles when
it is to the government's advantage; ,1s they seem to be "subjected constantly to influences that induce them to distort the law and policies relating to government contracts to the detriment, or at least annoyance, of
people who engage in business with the government"; 6 9 and they are induced to "cover up" their mistakes "if necessary even by unfair dealings
with third persons."7 All of this is wearisomely familiar, and contracting
officials have grown tired of even trying to refute it. Even more familiar
are the charges, often made by the same person in almost the same breath,
despite their palpable inconsistency, that contracting officers on the one
hand squander the taxpayer's funds, and on the other are mean and
71
niggardly in recognizing contractors' claims to compensation.
I can only say, after eight years of rendering legal advice to hundreds
of contracting officers and procurement officials, of all ranks and grades,
64 Id. at 248.
65 Id. at 250.
66 Id. at 253.
67 Id. at 254.
68 Id. at 255.
69 Id. at 256.
70 Ibid.
71 Mr. Stelzenmuller seems guilty of this very inconsistency.
note 1, at 256, and n.69.

See Steizenmuller, supra
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that such sweeping charges are unjustified. Contracting officers, like other
human beings, are of three different sorts, good, bad, and indifferent. But
as a class, and with few exceptions, they try to do the best job they
can for the taxpayer, while striving to be fair toward those with whom
they deal. Perhaps a few in their zeal do overstep the bounds and treat
contractors with undue severity. For every such instance, I can think of
a dozen cases in which contractors have been guilty of shhrp practice, or
of shameless grasping for unjustified compensation. We live in an imperfect world, and the best of us can ill afford to boast of his virtue. Government contracting officials are no exception to the general rule. But the
charge that the Government, on the whole, treats its contractors unfairly
or unjustly is one which the record simply does not sustain.

